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der not to restrict the many because of the needs. of the few, to 
provide a special unit in the form of a small prison hospital where 
th~ needs of the criminal patient could be adequately met. How-
ever, for the courts to continue to commit to conventional hospi-
tals such offenders whose abnormal behaviour constitutes a real 
~reat to other patients and staff is unrealistic, to say the least. 
I would like to conclude with a .plea to all my legal and medical 
colleagues not to allow my list of shortcomings and criticisms to 
overshadow my praise and admiration for the way in which justice 
is done and is seen to be done in the Maltese Courts of Law. 
CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS AND 
JURIDICAL PERSONALITY 
Gtnoo SALIBA 
IN regulating Civil Partnerships the Maltese legislator certainly 
did not intend conferring on them legal personality. This can be 
concluded by reference to Italian law of the same period i.e.- the 
Civil Cod~ of 1865, and by analogy from a consideration of the his· 
torical aspects of the question in the case of commercial partner-
ships. 
Before examining the status of civil partnership in the Italian 
Civil Code it may be apposite to explore the antecedents of the de-
finition of the contract of partnership contained in Sec. 1738 of our 
Civil Code - originally Art. 1404 of Ord. VII of 1868. 
Partnership is a contract whereby two or more persons agree to 
place a thing in common, with a view to sharing the benefit 
which may derive therefrom. 
This is basically the same definition as that of the Roman so-
cietas, as indeed is the notion of civil partnerships in practically 
all continental codes including the English Partnership Act of 
1890. Under Roman Law the societas was c~nsidered to be a con-
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sensual contract, bilateral and plurilateral. By means of this con-
tract two or. more persons agreed to pool goods or services, or both, 
having as their object the exercise of an economic enterprise in 
common with the intention of dividing the benefits according to an 
established proportion or, in the absence of an agreement, i~ equal 
parts. Voet held that Societas est contractus juris gentium, bonae 
fidei. consensu constans, semper re honesta, de lucri et dam.rd 
communione. Still in classical times it was not essential that the 
purpose of the societas be profit nor that there be an economic ac-
tivity, as there could be a societas for the common enjoyment of 
property or service. la the modem concept, the intention of sharing 
the profits and specifically of becoming partners is essential. Yet_ 
this does not affect the status of partnership. 
la Roman L~w a partnership was not an incorporated association. 
Roman Law only bestowed on the societ as an internal contractual 
bond existing between two or more parties to the contract. Though 
societas was distinguished from condominium, the legal relation-
ship . between the parties was considered to be that existing bet-
ween co-owners.· There were no special tribunals to which matters 
arising out of societas were referred. The debts of a societas were 
apparently joint though not joint and several. The heres of a de-
ceased partner could not succeed to the rights of the deceased 
even by express stipulation. All this makes it quite clear that no 
juridical personality was attributed to a societas. 
The general p~ovisio_ns of our contract of parmership have been 
inspired by the French Civil Code. Our section 1738 is in fact a 
literal translation of section 1832 of the French Civil Code. In its 
tum the French institute owed its ancestry to Roman Law though 
by that time it was a rather distant relative. Still BAUDRY-LACAN-
TINERIE and WAHL rightly assumed that in 1804 there was no ma-
nifest intention in the Code Napoleon to change the status quo an-
te namely that civil partnerships did not constitute a personnalite 
morale. POTHIER who was the source of the definitioq of the Code 
Napoleon considered ·the partners as co-owners in regard to the in-
division of things held in partnership. He recognizes in each part-
ner the right to create obligations in regard to and also alienate, 
things belonging to the partnership, if not in their entirety, at least 
in regard to that part which is equivalent to his share. He gives to 
the division a retroactive effect by means of which ea~h partner is 
deemed to have been always owner of things or property constitut-
ing his share, whatever other solution may be compatible with the 
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personification of a civil partnership. 
It is safe to argue, in the circumstances of both its immediate and 
remote ancestry, that by direct analogy and inference th~ civil pan-
nerships envisaged in our code were not intended by the legislator 
in 1868 to have juristic personality. 
According to the Italian Code of 1865 partnership is a contract 
(Art. 1'597) which produces solely a bond of obligation between the 
parties; there is a coming together of individuals who enter into 
reciprocal obligation to co-operate through their combined activity 
or through financial means to pursue a common policy, co divide 
profits, and therefore it is a contractual reunion of a number of in-
dividuals, not a new entity. 1 There existed reciprocal obligations 
between individuals, but this internal state of obligation does not 
alter their juridical status of owners of property, of contracting 
patties, of parties in judicial proceedings. It is the parties in their 
own name who perform juridical acts, who acquire rights individual-
ly, who personally assume obligations, being responsible thereto 
with their own property. While the internal partnership bond can 
produce effects between those whom it binds together, it does not 
actually have any effects .on third parties. In regard to these, the 
partners do not present themselves as such, but as individuals, . as 
persons having rights and entering into obligations and not as an 
entity distinct from them as individuals. 
Italian doctrine used to deny the grant of juridical personality to 
civil partnerships. Among these were Giorgi, Pacifici-Mazzoni, 
Chiroai, Vighi and Cuturi. RODINO, however, tended to recognize 
in pa~tnerships an external efficacy to which third parties granted 
recognition which was binding in their regard. VITALEVI2 declared 
that partnership was not a legal person, but actually an abstract 
juridical unit. DE ·ROSSI asked himself Sono le Societa Civili Enti 
Collettivi Distinti Dalle Persone Dei Soci? (Napoli, 1899) and rep-
lied in the negative. Yet he criticised the legislator for falling 
short of a logical principle of law: partnership presented all the es-
sential characteristics of juridical personality in that recognition, 
he asserted, was not an essential element but a condition so that 
the institute could function. 
The primary reasons adduced by the draftsmen of the 1882 Ital-
ian Commercial Code for An. 8 which 'included any commercial 
1 Dernberg, Burgerliches Recht, Vol. II, 2, 335 
2 Communione Vol.I pp. 77, 81 e Vol.II p.620 
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pannership' in the definition of the term trader was to remove any 
doubt about the legal personality of commercial partnership, a per-
sonality that was denied to associazioni in partecipazione. It is 
therefore quite in order to deduce that such personality was denied 
even more emphatically in the case of civil partnerships. It was on-
ly by Act XXX of 1927 that this amendment was introduced in our 
Commercial Code. Yet even in these instances, recognition of le-
gal personality was only indirect. The Maltese legislator finally 
made the situation juris et de jure in 1962 when in Sec. 3 ( 2) of the 
Commercial Partnerships Ordinance it was provided that •a com-
mercial partnership has a legal personality distinct from that of its 
members.' Up to date the law ut sic has been singularly silent on 
the question of making a civil partnership a legal per son a. 
One feature peculiar to the English law of partnership, and dis-
tinguishing it from the laws of other European countries and of 
Scotland, has been and (in large measure) still is, the persistency 
with which the firm, as distinguished from the partners composing 
it, was ignored both at law anJ in equity. 3 As no one can owe mo· 
ney to oneself, it was held that no debt could exist between any 
member of a firm and the firm itself. This non-recognition of the 
firm was a defect in the law of partnership, declared LINDLEY. 4 
He said that, had English law assimilated Scots Law, the diffi-
culties of suing and being sued, and of dealing with partners ab-
road, would have been greatly diminished. The firm is not a corpo-
rate body in England because it is a joint enterprise, all partners 
are taken to be each other's agents in respect of all acts done in 
or about the partnership business, and, for convenience they may 
sue and be sued in the name of the firm. Thus, as a general rule, 
any act done in furtherance of the business by one partner binds 
the rest even though he has done it without their authority. This 
rule is, in the nature of things, subject to certain exceptions. 5 In 
Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from the partners of whom 
it is composed, but an individual partner may be charged on a dee-
3 Sec. 4(1) of the Parmership Act, 1890, gives the meaning o.f firm as 
those ipersons who ~ave entered into partnership with one another! Sec. 1 
defines partnership as 'the re la ti on which subsists between personal car-
rying on business in common with a view of profit.' Sec. 45 provides that 
'the expression business includes every trade, occupation or profession.' 
4 0n Partnership, 12th Edition, 1962 p. 5. 
5 Philip Jones, Introduction to English Law p. 96 
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ree or diligen·c~6 directed against the firm, and on payment of the 
debts is entitled to relief pro rata from the firm and its other mem-
bers. 7 
The Italian Civil Code of 1942 practically annulled the two mo-
tives justifying the existence of civil partnerships in the previous 
Code, and which in fact still exist in other countries, including 
ours. The first consideration was the fact that the notion of the 
enterprise was more or less limited to that of commercial enterpris-
es with the result that the activities of production, that could be 
either of a commerdal or of an agricultural nature, became juridi-
cally extraneous to such sphere of activities. The second reason 
was based on a wider notion of partnership that was extended to in-
clude - as An. 1697 of the ·Repealed Civil Code of Italy provided 
- every contract by means of which «cwo or more persons agreed to 
place something in common with a view to sharing the benefit which 
may derive therefrom'. Note the use of the exact words of our own 
section 17 38. 
The present general notion is that by means of the contract of 
partnership two or more persons contribute things or services for 
the exercise in common of an economic acci vity with a view to di-
viding the profits (Art. i247). The 1942 Civil Code achieved a mas-
terly stroke in regulating together commercial partnerships and a 
single type of civil partnership - the societa semplice. 
The new Code substituted the old variety of civil partnership by 
a completely new type. Like the societiz civile of the 1865 Code, 
the new type of partnership ·can be best explained in a purely ne· 
gative manner in that it can be defined as a partnership which is 
not intended to exercise acts of trade. It is obvious from the pro· 
visions of Art. 2247, that the societa semplice does not have ele-
ments that are identifiable with the generic ones of the other types 
of partnership. These have at least one common denominator, that 
is the exercise of a commercial activity. The 'commercial' partner-
ships are established in accordance with one of the types regulated 
by Chapter III and other subsequent chapters in .Title V. Unless the 
partners had decided to establish their partnership to conform to 
one of the- seven types envisaged by the new Code• the partnership 
6 diligence = security for a debt 
7 Sec. 4(2) of the Partnership Act 
8 socieca in nome collettivo ( Art.2291), in accomandita semplice (art. 
2313), in accomandita per azioni (2462), per azioni (2325), a responsabi-
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is-that of the new concept - soczeta semplice. 
Therefore the societa semplice is one which does not cater for 
nor is it connected with commercial activities or enterprises. This, 
in effect, excludes from the sphere of activities, functions or inte-
rests of the societa semplice such economic activities that are 
qualified by Art. 2195 as being of a commercial character. These 
are (a) industrial undertakings connected with the production of 
wealth or of services, (b) the acts of an intermediary in the circu-
lation of wealth, (c) any undertaking relating to transport by land, 
sea or air, (d) banking and insurance transactions, and (e) other 
acts auxiliary to the transactions or undertakings previously men-
tioned. So that a societa semplice can be directed to an unlimited 
number of uses that range the whole gamut of economic acts, which 
must, however, exclude completely and irrevocably those listed 
above and which fall under the description of 'commercial' or 'act 
of trade'. It is almost essential that not only must the activities of 
the societa semplice be non·commerci"al but in addition it must not 
be organized on the lines of any of the ·other s.even types of com-
mercial partnerships. · 
The societa semplice, as a type of partnership, -is an invention 
of the 1942 Italian Civil Code. It is a type that does not have pre-
cedents in Italian legislative tradition nor has it a counterpart in 
corresponding figures of other legislation. 
Though the societa semplice can only be described, as has al-
ready been pointed out, in negative terms, as was the case with 
the societa civile, yet it has a structure that is radically different 
from civil partnerships and such as to internl;pt every continuity 
between the two institutes. 
The societa c-ivile was still substantially the ancient societas 
of R'oman law preserving throughout its long existence its pristine 
characteristics of satisfying the _ needs of. transactions connected 
with agriculture and, by and large, of non-commercial aces. 
It has been possible for the societ?i semplice to become, in the 
present Italian Code, the prototype of the entire category of the so· 
called 'personal' partnerships. In fact the Civil Code attributes to 
it norms and notions that are, in principle,. meant also to regulate 
lita limitata (2472, 2476), cooperativa a responsabilita illimitate, and ccr 
operativa a responsabilita limitata per quote o per azioni (2511, 2513, 
2 514, 2541). The series is completed by the societa d f armamento fra com-
proprietari di navi (Art. ~78-286 cod. navig.) 
72 
partnerships en nom collectif (Art. 2293) and, in so far as applic-
able with regard to this latter type of partnership by analogy or 
contrast, also those norms applicable to the societa in accomandi· 
ta semplice. 
It appears to be based on the commercial partnership pattern 
though essentially it cannot have any commercial connections. 
The societa semplice has become once again - as had the old ci-
vil partnership - an edifice, and an important one, in the agrarian 
and economic structure of Italy. 
According to Art. 2266 the societa semplice acquires rights and 
assumes obligations through the partners who have the power to 
represent it, and appears in judicial proceedings in the person of 
such partners. The things contributed by the partners and the sue· 
cessive increments thereto form the patrimonio sociale that serves 
to satisfy the claims of creditors of the partnership with the excep-
tion of those personal creditors of the partner who will have to re-
quest anticipated separation of the assets of the debtor partner 
from those of the partnership if it is proved that the ocher assets 
of the debtor arc insufficient to meet the claim (Art. 2270). More· 
ove·r creditors of the partnership could sue not only the patrimonio 
sociale but also the individual. partners, all held personally and 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership. The 
cre~itor of the partnership does not have the duty to enforce his 
rights first on the assets of the partnership: however the partner 
called upon to settle the debts of the partnership ·may exempt him-
self from paying by indicating the partnership's as secs over which 
the creditor's claim can easily be enforced. 9 
The societa semplice is very similar to commercial partnerships 
yet in comparison to their abundant variety, but which in effect are 
hardly distinguishable in essence one from the other, it. is a. sin-
gular and unique type. 10 It is not correct, there fore, to say, argues 
Brunetti, 11 chat the soci eta semplice corresponds to the old civil 
partnerships, as was claimed by Potzulu. 12 Brunetti holds that 
9 Prof. Francesco Calgano; Nuovissimo Digesto Italiano Vol. XVII pp. 545-
61 
10 Mossa, cLa Nuova Scienza del Diritto Comme~ciale' in Rivisca del Di-
ricco Commercial, 1° p. 144 
11 Trattato del Diritto delle Socieca, p. 335 
12 in Panorama del Codice Civile in Giurisprudenza Italian a, 1941 IV, c. 
137. . 
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structurally the societa semplice resembles the commercial partner-
ship of persons. 
The Minister piloting the new code declared that the societa 
semplice is the most elementary type of partnership. 13 Yet, if it is 
correct to say that a group of partners or a partnership and the pat· 
rimonio sociale are clearly distinct from the individual partners 
and their own patrimonio, it. can hardly be called an elementary or-
ganization. In a later scacement 14 the Minister said 'the patrimon-
ial autonomy is recognized within determinate limits.' This is prov· 
ed by the fact that in its internal relations the partnership recog-
nizes the right to the individual partner of his own share, which at 
the liquidation stage is attributed to him after that the partnership's 
debts are paid. Now Brunetti agrees, with Potzulu, that the autono-
my of the partnership funds is less rigid than ' in any other type of 
partnership since the particular creditor of a partner cannot exer-
cise his rights on the common funds but can only exercise an ac-
tion on the share due to his creditor in accordance with Art. 2270. 
Yet there is without doubt autonomy, and this can hardly justify 
calling the new type of partnership the 'most elementary'. 
The Minister stated that it was exactly in the recognition of pat-
rimonial autonomy that there is substantial difference between the 
regulation of the soci eta semplice and that of the soc ieta civile of 
the code of 1865. 
The societa semplice is a true and proper partnership, the cha-
racteristic feature of which is undoubted! y derived, within certain 
limits, from the features of traditional commercial partnerships. 
However certain fundamental differences exist: between the societa 
semplice and other types of partnership, among which in primis, 
absence of publicity, and other decisive differences are met re-
garding the contract of partnership, regime of responsibility, dis-
solution, winding up and so on. 15 
This explains why provisions have been adopted as Art. 2267, 
2268, 2270 and 2271 that were limited to commercial partnerships 
in the Codes of 18'55 and 1882. 16 
Finally it ought to be noted that the partnership property of the 
societa semplice as is the case with other partnerships of a per-
u Rel. Min. n. 931 
14 Rel. Min. n. 932 
15 Romano-Pavoni, Teoria delle Societ8, p. 134 
16 Brunetti, Trattato del Diritto delle Societa p. 347 & n. 24 
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sonal nature, belongs to the group: rights thereto or relative to it 
do not pertain to A and B, and C etc. but co A, B, C together i.e. 
collectively; no one possesses a share of the things forming the 
patrimonio sociale _but each one naturally has an interest in it. 17 
The German Code regufates civil partnerships. 11 Some associa-
tions, though formed for commercial purposes e.g. associations of 
artisans or professional people (which are only civil partnerships), 
ad hoc syndicates and many . cartels, are governed by the Civil 
Code. Ci vii partnership is not in fact a legal person since the Ci-
vil Code deals only with two types of juristic persons in private 
law: Associations (Vereine) and Foundations ( Stiftungen). These 
are considered as corporations in German law. Unincorporated _ as-
sociations, according to Sec. 54, are legally treated as if they were 
partnerships. Members of the association acting ~n the unregister-
ed association's name are held to be personaliy responsible since 
the association does not enjoy the benefit of the personality dis-
tinct from that of its members. 
The 'open' commercial partnership is not a legal person, yet it 
can under, and because of, the firma acquire rights, including real 
property, and incur liabilities, and sue and be sued. As a rule an 
unregistered association cannot be a plaintiff in civil proceedings. 
Still it appears that it is being accorded the same benefit as the 
'open' commercial partnership. The Federal Supreme Court has 
since the lace Fifties begun to relax the rule of incapacity co be 
plaintiffs. On the other hand unincorporated associations can be 
defendants in accordance with a special rule of the Code of Civil 
Procedure (Sec. SO (2)). Their property can be the subject of bank· 
ruptcy proceedings. They are therefore treated as if they were in· 
corporated associations like the Vereine, but they cannot be en-
tered as owners of real property in the Land Register. Since civil 
partnerships are, in all the aspects that matter, similar to unregis· 
cered associations that in tum are given treatment identical to the 
topen'- commercial partnership, it follows that civil partnership too 
enjoys the same benefits. 
It appears therefore that though civil partnerships, 'open' com-
mercial partnerships, and unregistered associations are not endow-
ed with juristic personality in German law, the Courts are directing 
these bodies along the road to becoming legal personae. If this is 
17 .d 
l em 
14 Gese llschaft des burgerlichen Recht in sections 705--740 
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not exactly the case, and even if it may not actually be the inten-
tion of the German Courts to do so, yet such partnerships and as-
sociations are being allowed to enjoy some of the more important 
qualities of a juristic person, at least in judiCial proceedings. 
The idea of legal personality of civil partnership prevails in 
French doctrine and jurisprudence, 18 but, warns FERRARA, 19 one 
must really be on one's guard against th.ls apparent authority not 
only because such doctrine is not based on any serious argument, 
and is in fact admitted as being a jurisprudential creation, I;iut be-
cause French writers speak of personality in such a wide and far-
from-preci se sense, that it is not possible to give it a juridical 
content. 
THIRY 20 and other writers put forward the theory that civil part-
nerships have a patrimonial autonomy, implying thereby a position 
analogous to -chat of legal personality. This, of course, does not 
necessarily follow. 21 
The French Law of 24th July, 1966 expressly recognizes per-
sonnalite morale in all types of partnerships. So both Civil and Com-
mercial partnerships have this common characteristic. An analysis 
of the notion of juridical personality in respect of partnership in· 
· modern French legal doctrine shows: 
(a) the present concept ·is that juridical personality has been 
linked from the beginning to the notion of the patrimoine d'af/ecta-
tion. According to this concept the possession of a p atrimoine, 
meant for the realization of a purpose, supposes a personnalite mo· 
rale. 
There are also two other concepts: either (i) juridical personali-
ty actually exists whereby from the moment that a group of per-
sons constitutes a distinct centre of interest, it has a collective 
will and a particular activity directed towards an end and so it has 
a real personality an~logous to that of individuals, or (ii) juridical 
personality does not actually exist except by means of a fiction; 
personality is conceded by the legisiator to certain groups th~t 
have to fulfil certain functional conditions without having recourse 
to this or that element which could justify the presence of a juri-
dical person. 
19 Planiol et Ripert. proit Civil Vol. II n. 1956 et 
~Des apports existants dans les societes civiles encre les associes et 
les tiers. 
21 but see ,Conclusion', last para. 
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(b} the French concept in fact varies in doctrine according to ju-
rists. Yet it is held from the very start that an association is en-
dowed with personnalite morale if it possesses a patrimony. The 
next argument is th.at there is no patrimony without there being a 
person; that a person has of necessity a patrimony, and that a per-
son, ha~ but one patrimony. It follows then that a Societe is pre-
sumed to have a patrimony distinct from that of the partners and so 
it is a persona. 
It seems then logical to assimilate the personnalite morale of 
partnerships with the physical personality of individuals. Just as 
the physical personality has a name, a residence, a capacity, a 
nationality, so the French partnership, both civil and commercial, 
has a name, a partnership residence (which is its domicile), a ca-
pacity, and equally a nationality. 
Article 5 of the law of 24th July, 19'5'5 established the date of 
assumption of juridical personality from the date of registration in 
the commercial register. The French legislature introduced this 
provision out of consideration for the laws of common market 
countries such as Germany, Italy, Holland. But the French solution 
concerns only commercial partnerships and not civil partnerships. 
These continue to acquire in full right the persormalite morale at 
the moment of conclusion of the contract. Civil partnerships are in 
effect not subject to the formalities of commercial partnerships. 22 
It is worthwhile considering the advantages and disadvantages 
of recognition of moral or juridical personality in ci vii partnerships. 
If civil partnership is a juridical person, the capital or assets 
of the partnership will constitute surety for the creditors of the 
partnership. In regard to the social asset~ such creditors will have 
preference over the personal creditors of the partners. This is the 
positio·n relating to commercial partnerships. 
But if civil partnership is just a mere group of in di vi duals, per-
sonal creditors will have equal rights over the assets of the part-
nership. 
In the case of a civil partnership being aper son a juridic a it will 
be this 'persont that will be the owner of the partnership's assets. 
As a result of this notion immovables of the partnership cannot be 
subjected to hypothecation by the partners. 
22 Michel de Juglart, Benjamin Ippolito, Cours de Droit Commercial ze 
Vol. PP• 65-68 
77 
If the civil partnership is not vested with personality the part· 
ners are co-owners of things placed in common in such manner that 
each of them is reputed, at the dissolution of the partnership, to 
have had ab initio ownership of the things which the division of 
assets has attributed to his share. 24 
Another point that is to be very carefully examined in all its 
possible aspects and implications is the liability of the civil part· 
nership qua persona in relation to damages. In a somewba.t analo· 
gous case, the German Verein is held responsible for any act giv· 
ing rise to a claim for damages done by the board or a member of 
the board or any agent of the Verein provided that the act was done 
in the exercise of the official duties of such member or agent. This 
applies alike to contractual or delictual damages. 25 
There had been at one time a discussion on whether it was ad-
visable-to introduce limited liability in civil partnerships. -The no-
tion of 'limited liability' in this regard is frought with dangers. 
Arguments for and against are many and it is not at all clear chat 
any party will actually benefit by such limited liability. In fact no· 
thing was done in this respect. It may be a good exercise to go 
deeply into the problems involved in an attempt to update not only 
the notion but also the actual functions of the civil partnerships. 
The specific point was one of the subjects of discussion in the 
Congresses of the International Bar Association since 19'59 and a 
negative vote was given to it in the 1970 Tokyo Conference. It is 
said that the only country in which professional partnerships with 
limited liability have been created is Holland, but, even here, there 
has been an objection raised by the Seate lawyers and it is now un· 
likely that such limited liability partnerships will be allowed. 
Our Courts have held the view that a ci vii partnership is ·not a 
juridical person. This is deduced from a decision which held that a 
civil partnership, just as an association, can be represented judi· 
dally by persons named as mandataries. Their representation is in 
any such case confined to the limits of their relative mandate. This 
is the substance of the judgement of A. Parnis, J. in Grech vs Dar-
manin ( 15 Gennaio 1907 - Vo-Z. XX - Ill - I) 
Such mandate is to be expressly stipulated in the statute of the 
association or contract/agreement of partnership. In the absence 
24 Marc ade et Pont, Spiegazi~ne del Codice Napoleone Vol. YIII parte 2na 
PP• ~05-7 
25 Sec.~ I of the German Civil Code. 
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of such express mandate then the so~jeta tiv.ili is represented by 
the ~ntire committee or by a per son that is so chosen or authoriz-
ed by the committee in a committee meeting. This was held by the 
Court of Appeal ~n Joseph Fenech ne vs Fortunato P etroni et. 
(L.A. Camilleri C.J., Montanaro Gauci, Harding]]. - 5 ta' April 
1954 - Vol. XXXVl/1-1-125) 
In 1953 in re Francis Sare vs Salv. Cacciattolo et (9 ta' ] armar 
1953 - Vol. XXXVll-11-617) the late Judge Alberto Magri held: 'il-
General Workers Union, bl;ala enti moral.i ... M'hemmx dubbju li l· 
G. W. U. hija wahda minn dawk li jissejjhu "societa civili", riko-
noxxuta jew p ermessa mill-ligi; kull min jinkiteb fiha jidf;ol f'rap-
porti kontrattwali magi.ha.' Apart from the merits of the case, the 
learned Judge must have somehow confused the issue. The Gene-
ral Workers Union is not and cannot under the circumstances of its 
existence be a civil partnership. It is a trade union and it is from 
this status that it assumes its juridical personality granted to it 
legislatively by the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance 
1945. 
Both doctrine and jurisprudence, as well as the more recent 
codes, have fallen in li ne with the spirit of the changing times. It 
is considered that the time has come to revise the old concept of 
civil partnership a_s being a type radically different from commer-
cial partnerships, corporations, or registered associations. 
The exigencies of modern life, where specialisation is a sine 
qua non, render it almost imperative for professionals such as 
lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers to form associations or 
partnerships. In this way they can give better and quicker service 
to their clients. The community at large will be much better off 
with the improved standard of service. However, since it will often 
be the case that a person seeking the service of a partnership of 
professionals may be served by different members of the partner-
ship, there ought not to be the financial burden on such members 
to bear responsibility either individually or jointly and severally. 
In any case this notion is neither strange nor revolutionary. A pa-
tient claiming damages that he has suffer"ed because of the negli-
gence of the house surgc::on or house physician or nurse at a hospi-
tal sues the board. of governors of the hospital and not the indi vi d-
ual concerned. Such cases are commonplace in the U.K. 
It is submitted that there are in actual fact many more advantag-
es and benefits accruing from granting legal personality to civil 
partnerships than withholding such personality even though this 
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may be considered by theorists as a legal fiction. 
Finally it may be agreed that by definition a civil p,artnership 
has the principal attributes of a juridical personality: (a) plurality 
of members; (b) common purpose i.e. a will of its own; (c) social 
patrimony i.e. since it has assets it will .also have to have liabi-
lities, and so has debtors as well as creditors. What is missing is 
the will of the legislator that as RICCI points out, is necessary to 
put the official seal on what already exists. Since this official 
blessing in the form of grant of le gal personality, even though it 
may be called juridical fiction, had been granted at first by the 
Courts and later by a law ad hoc on commercial partnerships, the 
next logical step would be to grant by statute legal personality to 
civil partnerships. 
T AQSI J:l T AS-SENTENZI T AL-BORD T 4 T·T AXXA 
TA' L·INCOME (1956) 
Kawza Nru. 111956 detiza fid-19 td Novembru, 1956 
L-appellant neguzjant ta' textiles appella mill-assessment gnax 
deherlu 1i kien eccessiv. 
Il-Bord f'dan il-kaz iffissa I-gross profit fuq kalkolu tar-rata med-
j a fuq is- sales. 
F' clan il-kai: ii-Bord ma ammettix tnaqqis ta' 1-ispejj ez ta' car, 
u osserva li 1-ispiza ghax: xiri ta' cash : registrar kienet ta' n arura 
kapit~i. Inoltri I-Bord ammetta d-deduzzjoni ta' 1-ispejjez ta' vjagg 
1-Ingilterra ghax 1-ammont ma kienx eccessiv. 
Kwistjoni .ta' kon tijiet. 
Kawza Nru. 211956 deciza fl.·14 ta' Frar, 1956 
Dan 1-appell gie dikjarat irritu u null ghax prezen tat xh1.1r wara Ii 
ghalaq it-terminu legali. 
Appell - fuori termine - null -
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